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 Global Compensation for Oil Pollution Damages: 
The Innovations of the American Oil Pollution Act  
James Boyd 
Abstract 
Via technology and operations standards, U.S. regulation exerts an important influence over 
worldwide marine safety standards. But in addition, several other aspects of U.S. law deserve wider 
international consideration and adoption. First, the Oil Pollution Act’s natural resource damage provisions 
are an innovative and effective way to deter marine pollution and provide for the restoration of injured 
ecological resources. Second, the relatively strict financial requirements imposed on marine transporters 
help ensure that polluters, rather than the public, pay if damage is caused. Liability and financial 
responsibility rules are not unknown in other countries. But the United States has a longer history with 
implementation and applies its rules more expansively. As both environmental concerns and global 
marine trade flows increase, U.S. experience with these rules will be instructive to other nations 
contemplating oil pollution reforms. 
Key Words:  Oil Pollution Act, Natural Resource Damages, Environmental Liability, Financial 
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Global Compensation for Oil Pollution Damages: 




U.S. environmental regulation relies in large measure on polluter liability as both a 
deterrent and means to finance compensation for environmental damages. While most U.S. 
environmental statutes also include ex ante operational, public process, and technological 
standards, the ex post imposition of liability is a distinctive feature of the American approach to 
regulation. Other nations employ liability, but no other nation as frequently or drastically 
imposes liability damages on the private sector. This paper describes the use of liability to deter 
and compensate for a particular kind of damages: those arising from marine and coastal oil and 
hazardous waste spills. 
Liability for environmental damages is strict under both U.S. common law and the major 
environmental statutes. Unlike fault-type liability rules, strict liability imposes the full burden of 
environmental costs on the pollution generator, independent of any precautions taken. In 
principle, strict liability leads to the internalization of otherwise externalized costs. Cost 
internalization is desirable for both distributive and normative reasons. Strict liability serves 
distributive goals by providing compensation to victims. It serves normative ones by creating 
financial incentives that lead to optimal levels of deterrence.1 
The principal law governing U.S. oil spills is the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), enacted in 
1990. The law includes a suite of requirements designed to improve the safety of vessels and oil 
transport facilities, including technology and reporting requirements. The law also makes 
                                                 
∗  Boyd is Senior Fellow and Director, Energy and Natural Resources Divison, Resources for the Future, 
Washington DC (boyd@rff.org). 
1  See William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Boston: Harvard University Press, 
1987) for a history of the development and justifications for the theory of strict liability. Strict environmental 
liability is also mandated by statute, as in the Superfund amendments.   
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operators liable for three broad classes of costs: response and cleanup costs, damages to private 
property, and damages to public natural resources. Similar in impact are regulations derived from 
CERCLA, the Superfund law that governs vessel-related hazardous substance releases. Because 
CERCLA liability parallels oil pollution liability under OPA for marine spills, regulations 
deriving from both laws will be discussed. 
This paper will focus on two aspects of OPA and CERCLA compensation law that are 
particularly distinctive. The first is the creation of liability for damages to public natural 
resources. Natural resource damage (NRD) liability is the most distinctive and complex aspect of 
the compensation issue. Other kinds of compensation—cleanup and response costs and damages 
to private property—are more common in other legal systems and more straightforward to 
calculate. Cleanup and response costs are the costs of minimizing an oil release and removing 
contamination from waters and shoreline. Property damages are damages to real estate, other 
property, or income.2  These kinds of damages are relatively conventional and easy to calculate, 
since damages can be easily quantified in dollar terms. Natural resource damages are a more 
novel and challenging aspect of compensation law. In particular, NRDs require the government 
to calculate the social loss associated with damages to resources that are not privately owned or 
traded in markets. Without private ownership and trade there is no clear way to derive the social 
value of damages (by inferring them from prices, for example). For this reason, NRD liability is 
controversial and raises a host of legal and technical issues, as will be discussed in Section 3. 
The legal history of the NRD concept will be reviewed, as will the government’s evolving 
approach to the calculation of such damages. The paper will also summarize the frequency and 
scale of NRD damages relative to other damages associated with marine oil spills.  
The second distinctive aspect of OPA is its approach to funding cleanup and restoration. 
OPA requires financial assurance as a pre-condition for operation. These requirements are akin 
to mandatory insurance or minimum capitalization requirements and are designed to ensure that 
responsible parties have the funds necessary to pay for damages. OPA also includes an Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund designed to pay for costs that are not immediately recoverable from private, 
responsible parties. Section 5 discusses these financing issues. 
                                                 
2 The government can recover lost government revenue (for example, lost fishing license revenue due to damage to 
a fishery).  
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Before describing OPA and its NRD provisions, a description of the broad legal 
environment is necessary. First, vessels can be liable for damages, including NRDs, under 
several U.S. statutes in addition to OPA. In particular, the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the 
National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA) provide legal authority for the collection of vessel-
related NRDs. Second, NRDs are a part of other environmental statutes that do not apply to 
vessels. The Superfund law (CERCLA), for example, imposes NRDs for damages associated 
with hazardous waste sites, vessels carrying hazardous cargo (other than oil), and some releases 
to inland waterways. Because OPA and CERCLA are the principal statutes governing vessel 
liability, they will be the focus of this paper.    
OPA is a potential model for other nations’ approaches to marine oil and hazardous waste 
pollution. As will be argued, the imposition of NRDs is an important innovation that addresses a 
global need: restoration of damaged ecological services and acknowledgement that natural 
resources have significant economic value that should be included in the calculus of damages. 
Another important component of deterrence that is worthy of emulation is mandatory financial 
requirements. Financial assurance promotes deterrence and compensation by fostering polluter 
cost internalization. It also harnesses the expertise of financial intermediaries, such as insurers, 
with capabilities in risk analysis and management. NRDs and financial responsibility 
requirements are what are most distinctive about U.S. maritime spill law and also what are most 
worthy of emulation by other countries.  
 
2. OPA and U.S. Natural Resource Damages Law 
This section describes the legal basis for natural resource damage liability under U.S. 
law, with particular emphasis on NRDs under OPA and CERCLA. Several U.S. environmental 
statutes establish liability for injury to natural resources. The Deepwater Port Act of 1974 and the 
Clean Water Act amendments of 1977 introduced NRD liability to federal law.3 Subsequent to, 
                                                 
3 For the CWA, see 33 USC 1251 et seq. Section 311 of the CWA regulates the discharge of oil and other hazardous 
substances into navigable waters, allows the government to remove the substance, and holds the responsible parties 
liable for that removal. The removal cost is defined to include “costs for restoration or replacement of natural 
resources damaged or destroyed.” 33 USC 1321. The Deepwater Port Act of 1974, which preceded the CWA, 
established liability for damages to natural resources to be recovered by a federal trustee and used for restoration. 33 
USC § 1501–1524, 1982. 
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and in most ways superseding, those statutes, liability for NRDs was established under 
CERCLA,4 OPA, 5 and the National Marine Sanctuaries Act.6 These latter statutes significantly 
expanded the reach and amounts of potential NRD liability. OPA, for example, significantly 
increased prior liability limits and allowed for the recovery of income lost because of damage to 
public resources.7 As noted above, liability for natural resource (and all other) damages under the 
statutes is strict in that liability is imposed irrespective of precautions, care, safety, or other 
measures undertaken to guard against injury. Among potentially responsible parties (PRPs), 
liability is joint and several.8 There is a statute of limitations for the recovery of damages, and a 
causal link between the defendant’s actions and a natural resource injury must be established.9 
Also, many U.S. states have their own natural resource damage laws.10 In fact, more than 
half the states have independent statutory authority to pursue NRDs.11 In some cases, the 
liabilities arising under state law can significantly expand upon federal liability. For example, in 
                                                 
4 Section 107 of CERCLA establishes NRD liability and authorizes federal trustees to recover damages for assessing 
and correcting natural resource injuries. 42 USC 9607(f)(1). 
5 Section 1002 of the OPA establishes liability for “injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of natural 
resources.” 33 USC 2702(b)(2)(A).  
6 The NMSA uses the same definition of natural resource damages as OPA, 16 USC 1432. Section 1443 establishes 
liability and authorizes civil actions to pursue cost recovery. 
7 The prior limitation on state-imposed liability was created by the Federal Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 
USC § 183–189. OPA contains liability limits of its own, as discussed in Section 5.2 infra, though these can be 
breached if the vessel operator is found to have been grossly negligent.  
8 33 CFR § 138.30(a). OPA and CERCLA do not explicitly provide for joint and several liability, though joint and 
several liability is strongly implied (CERCLA, 42 USC 9607; OPA 33 U.S.C. 2702(d). Court interpretations of the 
somewhat vague statutory language, however, have established joint and several liability as the rule when damages 
are indivisible. For a CERCLA case, see United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) at 
810–811. For an OPA case, see Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Conewago Contractors, Inc., 1994 WL 539326, *8 (M.D. Pa. 
1994), citing 136 Cong. Rec. H6933-02, H6936 (daily ed. August 3, 1990). 
9 The statute of limitations for filing an NRD claim is three years from completion of cleanup at an NPL site, or 
three years after discovery of NRDs at a non-NPL hazardous waste site. CERCLA, 42 USC 9612(d)(2); OPA, 33 
USC 2712(h)(2). 
10 In some states—Pennsylvania, for example—even municipalities can sue for NRDs. 35 PA. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
6020.507(a). 
11 As of 1995, one survey found that 28 states had passed laws authorizing NRD recovery. Environmental Law 
Institute, An Analysis of State Superfund Programs: 50-State Study, 1995 Update. ELI Project #941724. p. 46. For a 
more recent but somewhat less complete state survey, see Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste 
Management Officials, Survey of State Remedial Program Activities in Natural Resource Damages, February 1997, 
at http://www.astswmo.org/Publications/ascii/nrdsur.txt. 
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contrast to federal NRD law, state NRD laws do not always cap liability.12 In most cases, 
however, state claims are pursued through federal law,13 and at least until the mid-1990s, few 
state NRDs had been recovered.14 
 
2.1 What Is a Natural Resource Damage? 
In physical terms, natural resource damages are damages to land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, 
water, groundwater, and other resources.15 Physical injuries can take a variety of forms but 
typically relate to adverse changes in the health of a habitat or species population and in the 
underlying ecological processes on which they rely.16 In legal terms, the definition of NRDs is 
restricted to resources that are owned, controlled, or managed by federal, state, or other 
governmental entities, including foreign governments.17 Damages to pure private property 
interests are not considered natural resource damages under U.S. law. However, the definition of 
natural resources is not limited to government-owned resources. What must be demonstrated is a 
“substantial degree of government regulation, management, or other form of control over the 
property” that is injured.18 Accordingly, injuries to natural resources on or associated with 
private property can lead to NRD claims.  
Defendants found liable for NRDs face three primary damage components: first, the cost 
of resource restoration to baseline conditions; second, compensation for “interim losses,” that is, 
                                                 
12 New Jersey is an example. NRD assessments are required under New Jersey law during any remedial 
investigation of a hazardous waste site. NJAC 7:26E-4.7. The Spill Compensation and Control Act establishes 
liability for NRDs, with no cap on liability. NJSA 58:10-23.11(u)(b)(4). In other respects the state’s law is similar to 
the federal, such as the definition of natural resource injury.NJAC 7:26E-1.8. 
13 States may recover NRDs under federal authority (CERCLA) at non-NPL sites within their jurisdictions. See 
Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials, note 11 supra, which found that 30 of 38 
states responding pursued NRD claims through federal law.  
14 According to the ELI report, note 11 supra, as of 1995, only eight states had recovered NRD claims under their 
statutes. However, it is likely that this number has expanded significantly in recent years.  
15 OPA 33 USC § 2701(20); CERCLA 42 USC § 9601(16).  
16 15 CFR 990.52. “Potential categories of injury include, but are not limited to, adverse changes in: survival, 
growth, and reproduction; health, physiology, and biological condition; behavior; community composition; 
ecological processes and functions; physical and chemical habitat quality or structure; and public services.”  
17 CERCLA § 101(16); OPA § 1001(20). 
18 Qualifying resources are “resources the government substantially regulates, manages, or controls”; see Ohio v. 
United States Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989), at 460–461. 
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the lost value of injured resources pending full restoration; and third, the reasonable cost of the 
damage assessments themselves.19 In some cases, the acquisition of “equivalent resources” can 
be used as a substitute for restoration.20 NRDs can also arise from natural resource injuries that 
have not yet occurred. Under both OPA and CERCLA, the government has authority to respond 
to, and recover costs for, “threatened” releases of oil or hazardous substances that pose a danger 
to natural resources.21  
In economic terms, the goal of federal NRD liability is to “make the environment and 
public whole” following a pollution event.22 In principle, this is straightforward and consistent 
with legal and economic theories of deterrence that emphasize the desirable consequences of 
social cost internalization by polluters. In practice, the determination of compensation amounts 
can be quite difficult, as will be discussed in Section 3.  
To further clarify the nature of natural resource damages, it is useful to distinguish 
between remediation and restoration. Remedial activities are cleanup actions designed primarily 
to reduce threats to public health. Restoration activities are directed at the recovery of resources 
themselves. This distinction is clearly evident in CERCLA. Remedial actions are typically 
undertaken only if a site is placed on the National Priorities List (NPL).23 The criteria for 
placement on this list emphasize threats to public health. In contrast, CERCLA restoration 
authority is the authority to restore or replace natural resources to the conditions that would have 
existed without the hazardous release.24  
 
                                                 
19 CERCLA § 101(6); OPA § 1001(5), § 1002(b)(2). 
20 33 USC 2706(d)(1)(A). 
21 33 USC 2702(a); 42 USC 9606(a).  
22 15 CFR 990.53. 
23 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can mandate certain actions, such as temporary relocation of 
residents, even if a site does not appear on the NPL. Under the National Contingency Plan, however (which 
establishes rules governing the response to hazardous releases), remedial actions may be taken only at sites on the 
NPL. 40 CFR 300.68(a). 
24 CERCLA § 107(f)(1); 40 CFR § 300.615(c)(3),(4). 
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2.2  Common Law Foundations  
The public trust doctrine is the common law foundation upon which liability for NRDs is 
based.25 Well before the passage of the relevant federal statutes, natural resource damages were 
collected under common law.26 In fact, the public trust doctrine is a legal concept from Roman 
law, applied historically to navigation and fishing rights. The doctrine held that the public 
(usually commercial) interests in navigable waters superseded any private claim to them.27 The 
doctrine has evolved in U.S. common law to represent the more general notion that the public 
has an explicit legal interest in the nation’s natural resources.28 Under U.S. law, these interests 
are now understood to include the preservation of noncommercial public interests, such as 
recreation.29 As a result, citizens can challenge private or government actions that threaten the 
public’s interest in natural resources.30 The same principle can be used to compel administrative 
actions by the government to protect resources under their care.31 Natural resources are often 
considered to be “held in trust” by the federal or state government. A government’s 
responsibilities as trustee can be challenged by private citizens.32  
Common law tort and contract principles have also been used to gain private recovery for 
natural resource injury. When individuals have a significant interest in public resources, they can 
sue to recover loss of those resources. A common example is when water pollution closes a 
                                                 
25 See James Power, “Reinvigorating Natural Resource Damage Actions through the Public Trust Doctrine,” 4 NYU 
Environmental Law Journal 418 (1995). 
26 State v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 671 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div 1972), reversed on other 
grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976).  
27 Joseph Sax, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,” 68 Michigan 
Law Review 471, 475 (1970). See Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) for an early statement of 
the principle in U.S. law.  
28 See National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983).  
29 As in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 
(1984); Marks v. Whitney 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971), concluding that it is in fact unnecessary to define precisely what 
public use is threatened by a natural resource damage.  
30 Citizens can sue “for the purpose of vindicating the public trust,” State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 224 N.W.2d 
407 (1974). 
31 Sierra Club v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974).  
32 For instance, Wisconsin holds the beds of its navigable waters in trust for the use and enjoyment of its citizens. 
Muench v. Public Service Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492, 501 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952). 
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commercial fishery, as in Louisiana v. M/V Testbank.33 A nuisance action can be brought, 
usually by a state, but in some cases also by private citizens who can show some individualized 
injury to themselves.34 
 
2.3 Administrative Issues 
OPA and CERCLA govern NRDs arising from the release of oil and hazardous 
substances, respectively. When a release occurs, either the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) or the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has authority over removal responses and  
other immediate actions. When oil or hazardous substances are released on land, CERCLA  
and OPA require EPA to investigate and respond. The USCG is responsible for releases  
taking place in coastal waters, including the Great Lakes. Authority for response to inland 
waterway releases is divided between EPA and USCG.35 Technical response actions and other 
procedures to be followed in the event of a release are governed by what is called the National 
Contingency Plan.36 
A different set of agencies is responsible for longer-term damage assessment and 
restoration activities. Restoration, assessment, and settlement of NRD claims are undertaken by 
federal, state, and tribal trustees. Only governmental trustees can seek natural resource damages. 
Private persons do not have the right to assert claims for natural resource damage.37 The 
principal federal trustees are the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 
                                                 
33 524 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (E.D.La. 1981), aff’d 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). 
In legal parlance, the issue decided in Testbank was whether the “contractual relational economic loss” suffered by 
the plaintiffs was recoverable in tort. The case involved the collision of two vessels with the release of toxic 
chemicals. The pollution led to the government’s closure of an area used for commercial fishing and in turn to a 
commercial loss for the affected fishermen. 
34 Cases where private plaintiffs successfully brought claims of public injury include International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1981). 
35 40 CFR 300.5. 
36 40 CFR 300. 
37 Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643 (3rd Cir. 1988). 
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the Department of Interior (DOI).38 Generally speaking, NOAA is the federal trustee for claims 
arising under OPA, and DOI for claims arising under CERCLA. Two sets of rules guide the 
agencies’ respective NRD assessment procedures.39 These rules also act as a blueprint for the 
determination of appropriate restoration actions. Accordingly, the damage assessment rules, 
together with the analysis of a specific site, largely determine the nature and scale of NRD 
recoveries.40 
There is no direct private right of action to recover NRDs under federal law.41 However, 
common law principles and federal administrative law extend the scope of possible citizen 
action.42 The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) allows citizens to challenge government 
administrative actions.43 Governmental actions affecting aesthetic and environmental interests 
associated with the use and enjoyment of natural resources are well within APA’s ambit.44 A 
central issue in such cases is the degree to which a private plaintiff can show a concrete, 
individual harm to a legally protected interest. Injury to a natural resource alone is an insufficient 
                                                 
38 The Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Energy can also be trustees. 40 CFR § 300.600. State and tribal 
trustees vary and are designated by the governor of each state or by tribal chairmen. 40 CFR § 300.605, 610. Under 
OPA, foreign officials can also act as natural resource trustees for foreign resources. OPA § 1006(a)(4),(b)(5).  
39 15 CFR 990 (the NOAA regulations); 43 CFR 11 (the DOI regulations). 
40 This should not be taken to suggest that recoveries are easily calculated via reference to an objective, 
unambiguous schedule of damages. The legal and technical uncertainties surrounding NRD assessment imply that 
PRP–trustee bargaining, as much as objective criteria, will determine the ultimate scale of financial damages. The 
damage assessment rules are discussed in more detail in Section 4. 
41 Gregg Spyridon and Sam LeBanc, “The Overriding Public Interest in Privately Owned Natural Resources: 
Fashioning a Cause of Action,” 6 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 287 (1993), citing Artesian Water Co. v. New 
Castle County, 659 F.Supp. 1269, 1288 (D.Del. 1987), aff’d, 851 F.2d 643 (3rd Cir. 1988). 
42 See Barry Breen, “Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages: Closing a Gap in Federal Environmental Law,” 
24 Wake Forest Law Review 851 (1989). 
43 APA covers the breadth of federal agency action. “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial 
review thereof.” 5 USC 702. 
44 As in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), in which the plaintiff sued under the APA alleging that the 
U.S. Forest Service erred in granting a construction permit for a ski area adjacent to a national park. The Supreme 
Court’s ruling held that “Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important 
ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the 
many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process,” at 734 
(though plaintiff’s claim failed because of an inability to adequately demonstrate an injury-in-fact). 
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basis for such a claim.45 Nevertheless, because so many government actions can have natural 
resource consequences, the scope for citizen-initiated action is potentially broad.  
Moreover, most federal environmental statutes explicitly authorize citizen suits that can 
lead to injunctive relief and, in some cases, civil damages.46 For example, although NRDs are not 
compensable to individuals under OPA, citizens can file suit to compel a federal agency to fulfill 
its role as a natural resource trustee.47 Typically, such suits are barred when a government agency 
is considered to be diligently prosecuting an enforcement action 
Numerous technical difficulties are associated with the calculation and application  
of natural resource damages, as discussed in the next section. But these difficulties should  
not obscure the fact that legal authority for the collection of NRDs is well established in the 
United States.  
 
                                                 
45 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555 (1992), which challenged several federal agencies’ decisions 
relating to the use of federal lands. “Respondents mistakenly rely on a number of other novel standing 
theories…[such as] that any person using any part of a contiguous ecosystem adversely affected by a funded activity 
has standing even if the activity is located far away from the area of their use” (at 556). 
But see Justice Blackmun’s dissent: “As I understand it, environmental plaintiffs are under no special 
constitutional standing disabilities. Like other plaintiffs, they need show only that the action they challenge  
has injured them, without necessarily showing they happened to be physically near the location of the alleged 
wrong” (at 595). 
46 A recent Supreme Court case addressed the conditions under which a citizen suit can compel a defendant to 
comply with regulatory permit violations affecting recreational and aesthetic interests. Even though no 
environmental harm occurred, the permit violation itself was found to create an injury-in-fact subject to redress (the 
same issue confronted in Lujan, note 45 supra). Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. 
120 S. Ct. 693 (2000). 
For a more detailed analysis, see Michael Healy, “Standing in Environmental Citizen Suits: Laidlaw’s 
Clarification of the Injury-in-Fact and Redressability Requirements,” 30 Environmental Law Reporter 10455, 
10465. “Laidlaw would thus appear to permit any person with a proper interest in a resource affected by pollution 
levels that are illegally high as a result of defendant’s statutory violations to show injury-in-fact as long as the 
person feels injured by that higher level of pollution.” 
47 33 USC § 2706(g). “Review of actions by any Federal official where there is alleged to be a failure of that official 
to perform a duty under this section that is not discretionary with that official may be had by any person in the 
district court in which the person resides or in which the alleged damage to natural resources occurred. The court 
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or 
substantially prevailing party.”  
10 Resources for the Future  Boyd 
3. Calculating Damages 
Natural resource damages are an established legal concept with a clear economic 
rationale. In practice, however, NRDs raise a host of difficult issues for regulators. By their 
nature, NRDs acknowledge that natural resources produce a collective social benefit. These 
benefits are distinct from benefits associated with private property interests. This means that the 
value of NRD-related ecological benefits is not typically revealed by market transactions. 
Instead, government trustees must calculate the lost social value using techniques that are 
technically challenging and sometimes socially controversial. This section describes the history 
of alternative NRD damage calculation methods, explores the technical issues involved with 
damage calculation, and reviews the current application of damage estimation methods.    
As will be seen, there are two broad ways to calculate an NRD. The first is to measure the 
lost social benefits arising from the damage. Basing penalties on the lost social benefits is the 
correct and most precise way to “make the public whole.” Unfortunately, it is also a difficult 
task. Measuring lost benefits requires extensive data and sophisticated ecological and economic 
assessment techniques. And many of the methods used to calculate lost benefits are subject to 
scientific debate. For a regulatory agency these characteristics are problematic, due both to cost 
and political acceptance. For these reasons, an alternative approach is increasingly employed: 
damages based on replacement cost. The focus of this approach is not on the determination of 
lost social benefits, but rather on the replacement of biophysical functions and the services they 
generate. For example, if an oil spill damages a seagrass bed the objective is to replace the 
seagrass and the services it provides, such as habitat for species that are commercially and 
recreationally valuable. The cost of replacement is the damage imposed. Ecological replacement 
costs should not be thought of as an “easy” task for regulators. But replacement costs are much 
easier to calculate than lost benefits.48  
 
                                                 
48 For government reports that describe the practical advantages of replacement cost-based damages over lost 
benefit-based damages, see Texas General Land Office, Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, Texas Natural 
Resource Conservation Commission, NOAA, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, “Damage Assessment and 
Restoration Plan and Environmental Assessment for the Point Comfort/Lavaca Bay NPL Site Recreational Fishing 
Service Losses,” 2001; and David Chapman, Nicholas Iadanza, and Tony Penn, “Calculating Resource 
Compensation: An Application of the Service-to-Service Approach to the Blackbird Mine Hazardous Waste Site,” 
Damage Assessment and Restoration Program, NOAA Technical Paper 97-1, October 16, 1998. 
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3.1 The History of NRD Assessment 
CERCLA and OPA directed the Department of Interior (DOI) and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to develop rules governing natural resource damage 
assessment. This section reviews the development of these procedures and outlines the basic 
determinants and methods used to value natural resource damage. 
DOI first published damage assessment rules in 1986.49 The rules established two basic 
procedures: Type A for small releases of oil and hazardous waste, and Type B for large and 
complex releases.50 These original rules took a relatively narrow view of the types of injuries that 
were compensable, the scope of compensation, and the methods to be used in damage 
assessment. The rules strongly favored a market-oriented approach to damages and established  
a hierarchy of assessment methodologies. If there was a competitive market for the resource,  
a diminution in the resource’s value (the damage) was to be captured by a price change. If this 
was inappropriate or impossible, standard appraisal methods were to be used. Only when  
neither of these was determined by the trustee to be appropriate would “nonmarket” procedures 
be used. In addition, the original DOI rules limited damage awards to the lesser of the  
resource’s replacement cost or the diminution in use value associated with the injury.51 
Moreover, damages were not to include those associated with nonuse values (e.g., option, 
existence, or bequest values). 
Two 1989 cases, Ohio v. Department of Interior and Colorado v. Department of Interior, 
forced DOI to revise those rules.52 The revised rules were published in 1994. In Ohio the court 
ruled that CERCLA does not in fact mandate a least-cost approach to damages, thus invalidating 
the “lesser of” damage rule. Instead, the court strongly favored the use of restoration as the basis 
                                                 
49 61 FR 20609, 1986. 
50 CERCLA sec. 301(c)(2)(A–B). OPA, 33 USC 2706(d). Type A assessment procedures are used for small 
incidents with limited duration and cost. 
51 43 CFR 11.35(b)(2–3), 1987. This “lesser of” damage rule is reflective of the common law standard for 
determination of tort damages. 
52 Ohio v. Department of Interior (880 F.2d 432, 442 [D.C. Cir. 1989]) and Colorado v. Department of Interior (880 
F.2d 481 [1st Cir. 1989]). For the purposes of this analysis, the Ohio case is more important, since it related to Type 
B assessment procedures. The Colorado case came to broadly similar conclusions regarding the original DOI rules 
but relates primarily to the more limited Type A procedures.  
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for damages, even if restoration is more expensive than monetary estimates of lost use value.53 
Based on the ruling, the current regulations allow for damages based on diminution in value only 
in cases where restoration is infeasible or where restoration costs are judged “grossly 
disproportionate” in relation to lost benefit measures, including lost nonuse benefits. The Ohio 
court also invalidated the exclusive reliance on market-derived definitions of damage.  
Under the current rules nonuse values such as option, existence, and bequest values are 
compensable.54 The revised rules acknowledge that “the mere presence of a competitive market 
[for resources] does not … ensure the price will ‘capture fully’ the value of the resource.”55  
The statutes are careful to not limit damages to those that can be directly measured in 
markets or that are based on observable resource uses. Second, as long as the agencies’ own 
damage assessment rules are adhered to, there is a “rebuttable presumption” of the analyses’ 
correctness and legal validity.56 Accordingly, the presumption provides agencies with 
considerable latitude in their choice of damage assessment methods. It has been suggested that 
Congress included the agency procedural advantage in OPA and CERCLA in order to expand the 
scale and applicability of NRDs beyond common law damage rules.57 A remarkable aspect of 
both OPA and CERCLA is that they have given DOI and NOAA significant latitude to resolve 
these difficult valuation issues.58  
                                                 
53 The NRDA rules’ current focus on the replacement cost of resources, rather than their estimated market value, is 
a direct outgrowth of these cases. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1990). Also, see discussion 
in Russell Randle, “The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent, and Effects,” 21 ELR News and Analysis 
10119 (1991).  
54 Compensable value includes “all of the public economic values associated with an injured resource, including use 
values and nonuse values such as option, existence, and bequest values.” 56 FR 19760, April 29, 1991. 
55 56 FR 19759, 1991. 
56 CERCLA § 107(f)(2)(C); OPA § 1006(e)(2). 
57 See Frederick Anderson, Natural Resource Damages, Superfund, and the Courts, in Valuing Natural Assets: The 
Economics of Natural Resource Damage Assessment, Raymond Kopp and V. Kerry Smith, eds. (Washington, DC: 
Resources for the Future, 1993). “[It is likely that], the rebuttable presumption was placed in the statute specifically 
in anticipation that the government would adopt regulations that would press well beyond traditional damage 
awards.” 
58 It should be emphasized that the difficulties are not related to “financial” or “economic” issues alone. The 
physical determination of injury itself poses significant technical challenges. For example, it is difficult to establish 
baseline conditions given natural variability, and the possibility of preexisting contamination. Also, the biological 
impact of loss of a subset of a biological (species) on a larger community is highly uncertain. The incomplete loss of 
a community can allow for accelerated biological restoration. As a final example, toxicity measurements for a given 
release on a given population are themselves a source of uncertainty. 
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In 1996, NOAA followed the 1994 DOI rules with rules of its own, to be applied to 
assessments authorized under OPA.59 The rules define the goals of compensation and establish 
procedures to assess injury, establish causality, and calculate damages. Damage settlement can 
be arrived at without precise adherence to the rules. Any settlement, however, requires adherence 
to the broader goals for compensation established by the rules.60 Settlements that fail to adhere to 
these standards can be challenged.61  
As noted above, the current emphasis is on restoration rather than a monetized estimate 
of lost benefits as the measure of damages. Although the “lesser of” rule has been abandoned, 
cost remains relevant to the determination of remedies. Technical feasibility and cost-
effectiveness must be considered in the choice of restoration projects.62 
In addition to restoration, however, the rules allow for compensatory damages, which 
relate to the loss in value experienced between the time of injury and full restoration. As the 
NOAA rules put it, the goal of the damage assessment is to “make the environment and public 
whole … [and is to be] achieved through the return of the injured natural resources and services 
to baseline and compensation for interim losses of such natural resources and services from the 
date of the incident until recovery.”63  
The NOAA rules provide trustees with wide latitude to choose among alternative 
valuation methodologies, including market price–based valuation methods, appraisal methods, 
hedonic analysis, and travel cost methods.64 The aforementioned methods are associated with the 
estimation of use values. As noted earlier, however, the rules explicitly allow trustees to recover 
                                                 
59 The rules are codified at 15 CFR 990 (the NOAA rules for OPA damages) and 43 CFR 11 (the DOI rules for 
CERCLA damages).  
60 15 CFR 990.25. “Trustees may settle claims for natural resource damages... at any time, provided that the 
settlement is adequate in the judgment of the trustees to satisfy the goal of OPA and is fair, reasonable, and in the 
public interest, with particular consideration of the adequacy of the settlement to restore, replace, rehabilitate, or 
acquire the equivalent of the injured resources and services.” 
61 See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Department of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir 1996), in which the 
court rejected an inadequate NRD settlement and defined minimal standards that settlements must meet. In 
particular, the settlement failed to involve restoration, a conclusion the court felt was unwarranted given the trustees’ 
limited analysis of options.  
62 43 CFR 11.82(d). 
63 15 CFR 990.10. For an example, see David Chapman, Nicholas Iadanza, and Tony Penn, “Calculating Resource 
Compensation: An Application of the Service-to-Service Approach to the Blackbird Mine Hazardous Waste Site,” 
NOAA Technical Paper 97-1, October 16, 1998. 
64 43 CFR 11.83. 
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lost nonuse values.65 The estimation of nonuse values raises significant methodological concerns 
and is viewed with particular alarm by potentially liable parties. For this reason, an independent 
panel was convened in 1993 to assess the validity of the so-called contingent valuation (CV) 
methodology to measure nonuse values. The NOAA Panel established a set of guidelines for the 
use of CV methods and concluded that CV can provide a valid economic measure of value 
associated with resources people do not actually use but whose existence they may nevertheless 
value.66 The rules now permit CV for estimating use and nonuse values but only when “no use 
values can be determined.”67 
 
3.2 The Challenge of Ecosystem Service Assessment 
For more than 20 years, economists have been experimenting with methods to estimate 
the monetary value of non-marketed ecological services. For an even longer period of time 
ecologists and other natural scientists have been grappling with ways to describe biophysical 
processes and the impact of human activity on biophysical outcomes. NRD assessment requires 
both biophysical analysis and economic analysis of the services generated by biophysical 
functions. Because ecological and economic systems are complex, scientifically rigorous 
assessment is a challenge.  
Economic valuation of natural resource damages is built on a foundation of biophysical 
assessment. Ecosystem structure and functions, as described and evaluated by ecological science, 
generate services valued by people. It is the services created by biophysical functions that yield 
social benefits. Ecological analysis, of course, is concerned with the biological, chemical, and 
                                                 
65 43 CFR 11.83; 15 CFR 990.30. “The total value of a natural resource or service includes the value individuals 
derive from direct use of the natural resource, for example, swimming, boating, hunting, or birdwatching, as well as 
the value individuals derive from knowing a natural resource will be available for future generations.” 
66 The panel concluded that “[contingent valuation] produces estimates reliable enough to be the starting point of a 
judicial process of damage assessment, including passive-use values (i.e., nonuse values).” Report of the NOAA 
Panel on Contingent Valuation, 58 FR 4601, January 15, 1993, at 4610. 
67 43 CFR 11.83(c)(2)(vii). 
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hydrological relationships that determine biological production.68 An ecosystem’s structure, such 
as size, vegetation, and boundaries, and its functional aspects, such as ability to absorb 
floodwater or remove contaminants from surface water, are biophysical contributors—as 
inputs—to the services the habitat generates. While economic and biological systems are clearly 
different in important respects, both economics and ecology seek to understand the activity or 
productivity of systems by understanding the systems’ basic components and the functional 
relationships between those components. 
The distinction between biophysical functions and ecosystem services can be defined in 
the following way: ecosystem services are the outcomes of biophysical functions that yield value 
to people. For example, the ability of wetlands to mediate extremes of flood and drought at a 
downstream location is a biophysical function. A service is created if the absorbed floodwater 
yields less damage to buildings, roads, and agriculture or if the higher flows in limited rainfall 
years support a recreational fishery. Even if an ecosystem rates highly in terms of a functional 
characteristic, that function may not provide a socially valued service.69 As another example, any 
consideration of the value of lost commercial and recreational fishing opportunities due to an oil 
spill in coastal wetlands must understand the role of the wetlands in fishery population dynamics. 
Leaving economic issues aside, ecological science is itself an evolving field where biological and 
physical interactions are often poorly understood, particularly where spatial phenomena are 
concerned.70  
For conventional, marketed goods economics prescribes market-based methods for 
valuing goods and services (and losses to those goods and services). Market-based methods use 
prices and behavior directly observed in the real world to calculate benefits lost or gained. The 
key to these conventional methods, and their relative simplicity, is that conventional goods and 
                                                 
68  There is also a long history of integrated economic and biological production function analysis in agricultural and 
natural resource economics. Among other things, agricultural studies show how substitution of one farm input for 
another (e.g. land for fertilizer, tractors for man-hours) affects production levels, or how landscape characteristics 
affect yields. For a general overview, see John Penson, et al., eds., Introduction to Agricultural Economics (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999).   
69 Another way to make the point is to consider functionally identical ecosystems. Functional equivalence does not 
imply equivalent social value. Wetlands with an equivalent ability to remove nitrates from groundwater or absorb 
floodwater pulses will nevertheless differ in their social value. This follows since the number of people whose 
drinking water is purified and the number of homes protected from flooding will not be identical.  
70 See David Tilman and Peter Kareiva, Spatial Ecology: The Role of Space in Population Dynamics and 
Interspecific Interactions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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services are privately owned and traded in functioning markets. Accordingly, prices and demand 
for such products are a good guide to the products’ social value. As described earlier, however, 
natural resources held in public trust are not owned, nor are they traded in markets. Accordingly, 
there are no direct price signals of social value. Therein lies the problem for economic 
assessment. Instead, practitioners must employ relatively unconventional “non-market” valuation 
techniques.  
Non-market valuation approaches fall into three broad categories: revealed preference, 
expressed preference, and derived willingness to pay.
71 Revealed preference studies look at the 
price people pay for marketed goods that have an environmental component. From those prices, 
inferences about the environmental benefits associated with the good can be made. One example 
is the value of habitat to commercial fishing. Another example is when people purchase a home 
near an aesthetically pleasing habitat with available access for recreation, home prices reflect the 
value of the aesthetic and recreation services realized by the homeowners.
72 Alternatively, for 
people who do not live near the site, recreational and aesthetic services can be valued by the time 
and money spent traveling to the area. These direct travel cost expenditures and imputed costs of 
travel time reveal a willingness to pay for the recreational services.
73 Differences in quality 
attributes can be valued if there are perceptible differences in the number, length, or cost of trips 
taken to sites of different quality.74 The quality change may be from an alteration to the site. 
Consider another example. Sediment, nutrient, or pathogen trapping that affects swimming beach 
quality at a remote location can be valued if the relationship between the habitat of the remote 
site and the recreational quality of the beach can be estimated. 
An expressed willingness-to-pay study asks people, in a highly structured way, what they 
would be willing to pay for a set of environmental improvements. Contingent valuation studies 
                                                 
71 For a good overview of these methods see A. Myrick Freeman, Measurement of Environmental and Resource 
Values: Theory and Methods (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1993). 
72 Hedonic analysis is used in this type of study. See, e.g., Brent Mahan, Stephen Polasky, and Richard Adams, 
“Valuing Urban Wetlands: A Property Price Approach,” 76 Land Econ. 100 (2000).  
73 There is a substantial literature on this subject. See, e.g., Kenneth McConnell, “On-Site Time in the Demand for 
Recreation,” 74 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 918 (1992). 
74 An important issue in travel cost studies, for example, is the definition of relevant substitutes for the sites in 
question. Northeast-Midwest Institute and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Revealing the 
Economic Value of the Great Lakes, 2001 (“omitting the prices and qualities of relevant substitutes will bias the 
resource valuations”), at 73. 
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and contingent ranking are examples.75 Surveys of expressed willingness-to-pay are expensive 
and controversial, and answers to questions may be affected by the specific context. The more 
complex the habitat change and its consequences, the more difficult is the challenge of survey 
design and interpretation. A principal drawback to this approach is the risk that people may 
misunderstand the precise service being valued when undisciplined by the need to spend their 
own money. Also, respondents may not have fully formed preferences for the service. For both 
of these reasons, they may misstate their willingness to pay.
76  
In a valuation survey, the questions are structured in such a way that a particular 
economic calculation can be extracted from the results—willingness to pay in terms of a 
hypothetical amount of one’s income for a change in the state of the environment. This 
calculation is expected to represent the nature of an individual’s preferences and is a way to 
aggregate those preferences over individuals in a population.77 
For many years, researchers have also derived benefits via simulation studies based  
on engineering analysis.78 For instance, if we want to know the value of having a wetland  
reduce flood damages we can, in principle, estimate the dollar value of real property damage  
due to a flood event, and estimate the greater likelihood such an event will occur if the wetland  
is destroyed.  
An important characteristic of benefit monetization studies is that they need not and 
typically do not monetize benefits arising from the entire suite of services generated by a site. 
This is true because different services typically require different assessment procedures. 
Recreational services will require one kind of study, eliciting existence values requires another 
approach, and understanding individual’s valuation of flood prevention yet another. Contingent 
valuation surveys can be designed to value a wider suite of benefits, but this complicates the 
administration and design of the survey. In many situations, it is not feasible to implement a 
                                                 
75 See Richard Carson, Nicholas Flores, and Norman Meade, “Contingent Valuation: Controversies and Evidence,” 
19 Environmental and Resource Economics (2001), pp. 173–210, for a review and defense of contingent valuation’s 
role in the evaluation of environmental goods and services. 
76 See, generally, Raymond J. Kopp et al. eds., Determining the Value of Non-Marketed Goods (Boston: Kluwer, 
1997), which presents a good collection of articles relating to the contingent valuation method. 
77 If a measure of public opinion is desired to support decision making, other public opinion polling approaches and 
calculations also might be considered. For example a survey that asked about levels of agreement with statements 
about options and tradeoffs may be seen as a kind of “valuation” effort.  
78 Orris Herfindahl and Allen Kneese, Economic Theory of Natural Resources, Charles Merrill, Columbus 1974. 
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survey to determine the value associated with each parcel of habitat of open space, preservation 
of an acre of wetland habitat, or increase in catch per unit of effort for a recreational fishery. 
Therefore, economists have long argued for the use of benefit transfer methods as way to avoid 
site-specific monetization exercises and minimize the need for costly new data collection.79 
Benefit transfer methods essentially take the benefits estimated at a well-studied reference site 
and relate those benefits to the benefits likely to be found at a site of interest for preservation, 
mitigation, or exchange. The “transfer” of the benefits is made a function of differences in the 
reference site and site of interest. Benefit transfer still requires data collection and careful 
econometric analysis, but it reduces somewhat the burden of new data collection. 
 
3.3 The Politics of NRD 
The previous section describes the scientific and technical challenge of non-market 
benefit estimation. Although mainstream economics now accepts the validity of nonuse values at 
a conceptual level, the methods used to calculate those values remain controversial.80 In 
particular, the science behind both the ecology and economics of this kind of assessment has 
been the subject of much debate.  
Fear of NRD liability has prompted a set of legislative reform proposals, associated 
primarily with the reauthorization of CERCLA. Although no reforms have been enacted and the 
possibility of reforms remains in doubt politically, the reauthorization debate provides evidence 
of the concerns being raised by the private sector regarding financial responsibility for natural 
resource damages. Criticisms highlight the discomfort with which the regulated community 
approaches the valuation of NRD claims. The law’s requirement that the public be “made whole” 
                                                 
79 For an overview of benefit transfer methodologies, see the special issue of Water Resources Research devoted to 
it, vol. 28, 1992. Also see S. Kirchhoff, B. Colby, and T. LaFrance, “Evaluating the Performance of Benefit 
Transfer: An Empirical Inquiry,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 35, (1997), pp. 75–93, and 
Raymond Kopp and V. Kerry Smith, Valuing Natural Assets: The Economics of Natural Resource Damage 
Assessment (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1995), p. 329. 
80 Northeast-Midwest Institute and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Revealing the Economic 
Value of the Great Lakes,” 2001, (“The development of natural resource damage assessment regulations was 
controversial because stakeholders disagreed over what damages would be assessed, how damages would be 
calculated, and how damages to environmental goods and services not valued in traditional markets would be 
calculated”), at 22. 
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following a natural resource injury, combined with the inherent difficulties of natural resource 
valuation, have been a source of political controversy and calls for reform.81 
A common feature of reform bills is the restriction or elimination of recovery for lost 
nonuse values.82 Some reform packages prohibit the use of the CV method to value NRDs.83 
Note, however, that none of these reform bills has passed, and there has been significant 
opposition to weakened NRD provisions, including opposition from the Clinton administration 
and from other administrative agencies.84 Some states limit the methodologies that can be used 
by states to calculate the scale of NRDs. An example is Michigan’s prohibition against use of the 
CV method to determine damages.
85 It should also be noted that the most controversial valuation 
methods, such as CV, have in actuality been employed infrequently.86 
 
                                                 
81 Consider the following representative comment in the U.S. legislature: “The liabilities imposed on vessel owners 
under OPA are subject to dramatic inflation because of the methodologies embraced by agencies of the United 
States in calculating natural resource damages.” Testimony of Svein Ringbakken, International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, June 26, 1996. 
82 See S.8, Part 403, 105th Cong., A Bill to Reauthorize and Amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Liability, and Compensation Act of 1980, introduced January 21, 1997 (there will be “no recovery under this Act for 
any impairment of nonuse values”), and S.1537, 106th Cong., Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1999, introduced in the Senate August 5, 1999.  
83 See S.8, note 82 supra, which states that a trustee’s claim for recoverable assessment costs “may not include the 
costs of conducting any type of study relying on the contingent valuation methodology.” 
84 See National Association of Attorneys General, Resolution, Superfund Reauthorization, Adopted June 22–26, 
1997, available at http://www.senate.gov/~epw/105th/joh_9-04.htm (accessed August 19, 2004) Also, see Charles 
Openchowski, Superfund in the 106th Congress, 30 ELR 10648, 10659. 
85 Michigan law establishes liability for natural resource injury (Act 451, MCL 324.20126a). However, contingent 
valuation methods cannot be used for damage calculations “unless a determination is made by the department that 
such a method satisfies principles of scientific and economic validity and reliability and rules for utilizing a 
contingent nonuse valuation methods or a similar nonuse valuation methods are subsequently promulgated.” MCL 
324.20104(3). 
The state of Texas lists a set of acceptable valuation methods. The list includes contingent valuation but requires 
that contingent valuation studies be undertaken only in accordance with guidelines established by NOAA. 31 TAC § 
20.32(f). 
86 See testimony of Douglas Hall, NOAA, Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, House of 
Representatives, July 11, 1995. “There have only been six contingent valuation studies completed to date, and only 
one in which the Federal Government was involved in litigation.” 
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3.4 Damages: Lost Benefits Versus Replacement Cost 
Most NRD cases demand significant amounts of data regarding both biophysical 
conditions and demand for the services damaged. The cases tend to be complex and have not 
always been successful.87 Whatever the precise approach, non-market benefit studies are 
complex, time-consuming, and costly. Methods seeking monetary estimates of ecosystem 
benefits are technically challenging, fraught with dangers that may not be obvious to non-
practitioners, and require significant amounts of data collection. In other words, economic 
valuation methods are expensive and difficult to execute, particularly by non-economists. A 
professionally credible study costs, at a minimum, hundreds of thousands of dollars and can 
easily cost orders of magnitude more.88  
It should not come as a surprise that NRD assessments have shifted from an emphasis on 
monetary benefit estimation to non-monetary techniques—in particular, habitat equivalency 
analysis.89 This is understandable given the practical difficulty of ecological benefit studies. It is 
important to note, however, that in principled economic terms replacement cost is not the 
preferred method for damage assessment. The reason is that the costs of replacing a lost 
biophysical function may exceed the social benefit of the function. In effect, replacement cost 
damages can lead to wasteful expenditure on relatively unimportant resource improvements.  
Consider a more conventional example to make the point. If a window is broken in an 
abandoned building we would not necessarily require its breaker to replace the window, since the 
building may be unused or near demolition. Replacing the window would in such a situation be 
wasteful. This same argument can hold in some cases of damage to natural assets. The 
alternative—explicit benefit estimation—as argued above can be costly and difficult. Also, the 
underlying uncertainties associated with biological systems make it difficult to say a particular 
biophysical function is as unimportant as a broken window in an abandoned building. The 
protection against particularly inefficient outcomes is the “grossly disproportionate” standard, 
                                                 
87 For an excellent description of the NRD process in court see David Chapman and W. Michael Hanemann, 
“Environmental Damages in Court: the American Trader Case,” in Anthony Heyes, ed., The Law and Economics of 
the Environment (Cheltenham, UK, Elgar, 2001). 
88 See Bill Conner and Ron Gouget, “Getting to Restoration,” The Environmental Forum (2004), pp. 19–29. In the 
case of the Exxon Valdez, government studies alone cost more than $100 million.  
89 See Carol A. Jones and Katherine A. Pease, “Restoration-Based Measures in Natural Resources Liability 
Statutes,” Contemporary Economic Policy, XV (October 1997); also see Monica P Medina, “Just Do It,” The 
Environmental Forum (July/August 2001).
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whereby benefit-based damages can be required only in cases where restoration is infeasible or 
where restoration costs are “grossly disproportionate.”90 
The NOAA assessment rules favor restoration over monetary measures largely because 
restoration costs are easier to estimate.91 Similarly, DOI is contemplating revisions to its NRD 
assessment rule, including a reduced role for methodologies that economically quantify damages, 
in favor of resource-based measures.92 A restoration cost estimate relies on easily computable 
capital and labor costs (e.g., the costs of dredging, species reintroduction, or contaminant 
neutralization). These costs are easier to predict, rely on fewer economic valuation 
methodologies, and are verifiable ex post.93 According to a NOAA director,  
Earlier damage assessment procedures emphasized determining a monetary value 
for the loss of use of the injured resources. Criticisms of this approach led NOAA 
to … develop regulations that focus on damages measured by the actual cost of 
restoration…. Focusing on determining the appropriate scale of restoration 
projects is preferable to focusing on the monetary amount of damages…. Instead 
of collecting damages, then determining how to spend that money on restoration, 
the goal of assessment is now focused on timely, cost-effective restoration of the 
natural resources that have been injured.94 
 
In general, there remains a pronounced desire to avoid monetization of losses and gains. 
Monetization is not prohibited but is rarely favored.95  
                                                 
90  See note 53 supra.  
91 For a discussion of damage assessment challenges, see Rebecca Renner, “Calculating the Cost of Natural 
Resource Damage,” Environmental Science and Technology 32:3 (1998), p. 86. 
92 Interior Department Revises NRDA Rule to Lessen Focus on Economic Impact, Environmental Policy Alert, 
(September 6, 2000), pp. 7–8. 
93 The private sector prefers restoration cost to monetization, largely because of the former’s greater predictability. 
See Guide to P&I Cover, The Standard (http://www.standard-club.com/frameset.asp, accessed September 16, 2004) 
responding to the NOAA rules: “The final rules are clearly much better than the initial draft rules because they 
concentrate on restoration. However, the rules still create the very real likelihood that trustees will produce large and 
speculative claims in the United States in respect of damages to natural resources.”  
94 Testimony of David M. Kennedy, Office of Response and Restoration, NOAA, before a joint House Hearing, 
Subcommittees on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation and Water Resources and Environment, March 24, 
1999, http://www.house.gov/transportation/cgmt/03-24-99/03-24-99memo.htm (accessed August, 18, 2004). 
95 See note 48.  Also, 15 CFR 990.53(d)(3)(ii). “If valuation of the replacement natural resources and/or services 
cannot be performed within a reasonable timeframe or at a reasonable cost…trustees may estimate the dollar value 
of the lost services and select the scale of the restoration action that has a cost equivalent to the lost value.” 
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How do replacement cost damages get assessed in practice? The easy part of this damage 
calculation is the cost of restoration to the damaged resource itself. The capital, labor, and other 
costs necessary to the restoration are the cost of replacement and form the basis of damages. 
There is a more difficult aspect of the damage calculation, however. This challenge arises 
because it is necessary to compensate for losses arising in the period between an incident and full 
restoration—a period that can span decades.96  
These are called “interim losses” and, by definition, cannot be achieved via on-site 
restoration. Accordingly, interim losses require a search for comparable restoration actions. This 
requires a comparison of natural resource services provided by different types of natural or 
constructed assets and across different sites. Numerous challenges are associated with this kind 
of comparison. A first step is the identification of comparable restoration alternatives. 
Comparable alternatives mean restoration actions that provide the same type of resources or that 
provide the same kind of services as the injured resources. Once comparable actions have been 
identified, the government must then determine “the scale of those actions that will make the 
environment and public whole.”97 Scaling often relies on the concept of ecosystem services.98 If 
a resource’s services are identified and the scale of those services estimated, the same can be 
done for a second, comparable resource. Protection, restoration, or enhancement of the second 
resource can then be defended as a comparable action. The NOAA rules, for instance, refer to 
both “resource to resource” and “service to service” valuation methods.99 One particular 
                                                 
96 There are two reasons that off-site restoration is typically needed to achieve full social compensation. First, 
complete physical restoration of the injured resource may be impractical. For instance, complete restoration of a 
damaged site is often cost prohibitive. If so, some other form of compensating restoration will be pursued, usually 
involving the enhancement of another comparable, but not identical, resource. Second, interim natural resource 
service losses must be compensated. Restoration of a site to prerelease conditions does not compensate for these 
interim losses. Supplemental restoration actions, either on site or off site, must be undertaken to compensate for 
those types of losses. 
97 15 CFR 990.53(d). For the CERCLA rules, see 43 CFR 11.80. “Damages may also include, at the discretion of 
the authorized official, the compensable value of all or a portion of the services lost to the public for the time period 
from the discharge or release until the attainment of the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of 
equivalent of the resources and their services to baseline.” 
98 43 CFR 11.71. “Services include provision of habitat, food and other needs of biological resources, recreation, 
other products or services used by humans, flood control, ground water recharge, waste assimilation, and other such 
functions that may be provided by natural resources.” 43 CFR 11.70. “Upon completing the Injury Determination 
phase, the authorized official shall quantify for each resource determined to be injured and for which damages will 
be sought, the effect of the discharge or release in terms of the reduction from the baseline condition in the quantity 
and quality of services provided by the injured resource.…”  
99 15 CFR 990.53(d)(2). 
23 Resources for the Future  Boyd 
replacement cost method is called Habitat Equivalency Analysis, which scales restoration to 
compensate for interim losses.100 The method involves adding up and discounting the stream of 
lost benefits and comparing that to the level of services created by a restoration project.101 
Habitat equivalency analysis and other replacement cost methods are used to avoid the 
challenges of monetary, benefit-based damage calculations. They are a pragmatic alternative, 
though not without their own challenges. What should not be missed is the importance of the 
U.S. government’s ability as a trustee to collect damages for injury to public natural resources, 
irrespective of the method used to calculate the damage. Other countries can learn from the U.S. 
experience in tackling the difficult issues raised by resource value methods. But the more 
important message is that natural resource damages are real in economic terms. Governments 
concerned with deterring and compensating for these real losses can look to the U.S. NRD 
experience as a successful first step. 
 
4. NRD Claims—Scale and Frequency  
The widespread application of NRD claims is relatively recent.102 For this reason, and because 
there is no central repository of data on NRD claims, it is difficult to accurately summarize the 
range of NRD awards collected in the United States. By far the largest NRD case was the Exxon 
Valdez recovery. The Valdez case involved $2.1 billion in cleanup costs, approximately $1 
billion in natural resource damages,103 and a $5 billion punitive damage award.104 Although a 
                                                 
100 See “Habitat Equivalency Analysis: An Overview, Damage Assessment and Restoration Program,” NOAA, 
2000 (“The public can be compensated for past losses of habitat resources through habitat replacement projects 
providing additional resources of the same type,” p. 1). 
101 Id., at 3 (“The process of scaling a project involves adjusting the size of a restoration action to ensure that the 
present discounted value of project gains equals the present discounted value of interim losses”).  For a concrete 
example, see David Chapman, Nicholas Iadanza, and Tony Penn, “Calculating Resource Compensation: An 
Application of the Service-to-Service Approach to the Blackbird Mine Hazardous Waste Site,” Damage Assessment 
and Restoration Program, NOAA Technical Paper 97-1, October 16, 1998. 
102 The first NRD case filed under CERCLA (New Bedford) was in 1987. Also, see Duane Woodward and Michael 
Hope, “Natural Resource Damage under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 14 Harvard Environmental Law Review 189 (1990), citing lack of NRD cases as of 1990. 
103 4 Oil Spill U.S. Law Rep., November 1994, at 13–14. 
104 The punitive damages have been appealed several times and have not been collected. In re Exxon Valdez, no. 
A89-095-CV (HRH) (D. Ct. Alaska, September 24, 1996). 
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particularly visible case, Valdez was unique in the scale of injury caused, damages awarded, and 
methodologies used, including extensive use of the CV methodology.105 
The government’s pursuit of NRDs continues to evolve as it gains legal and economic 
experience with this kind of case. Meanwhile, several government and research studies provide 
at least a rough guide to the scale and likelihood of NRD claims. Two U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) reports have addressed the scale of NRD claims under CERCLA, looking at 
numbers that reflect NRDs collected both inland and in the coastal zone. The first report found 
that as of April 1995, federal trustees had come to monetary NRD settlements in 50 cases106 for a 
total of $106 million, with recoveries ranging from $4,000 to $24 million.107 As of that time, the 
five largest NRD settlements (not necessarily recoveries) ranged from $12 million to $24 
million.108 Another 50 cases had settled with no NRD-specific payments, usually because site 
remediation activities were judged to have sufficiently addressed natural resource damages. The 
numbers were updated in a second report later in 1996.109 As of July 1996, total NRD settlement 
amounts had increased to $109 million from cases at 62 sites.110 
More up to date numbers are available for NRD recoveries involving NOAA’s Damage 
Assessment and Restoration Program. These numbers reflect coastal NRD recoveries brought 
under OPA, CERCLA, NMSA, or the CWA. They do not reflect “inland” NRD recoveries.111 
Between 1991 and 2002 total NRD awards total $290 million from 56 cases. The average NRD 
recovery for these coastal cases is $4 million per case. The average NRD costs of oil-spill related 
damages are lower than for hazardous waste related damages. For cases authorized under 
                                                 
105 See Richard T. Carson et al., A Contingent Valuation Study of Lost Passive Use Values Resulting from the 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (Report to the Attorney General of Alaska), November 10, 1992. 
106 At that time there were 1,290 sites on the National Priorities List. 
107 U.S. General Accounting Office, Outlook for and Experience with Natural Resource Damage Settlements, 
GAO/RCED-96-7l, April 1996, pp. 4–5. 
108 As of July 1995, only about 40% of the $83.8 million had been collected. 
109 U.S. General Accounting Office, Superfund: Status of Selected Federal Natural Resource Damage Settlements, 
GAO/RCED-97-10, November 1996. 
110 Ibid. As of July 1996, about 80% of the settlements had been collected. 
111 These data are based on NOAA, Damage Assessment and Restoration Program, Natural Resource Damage 
Settlements and Judgments, 2002. The numbers reported here are based on statistics that exclude two inland cases 
(Blackbird Mine and Iron Mountain Mine) from the NOAA data. 
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CERCLA the average NRD award is $7 million, while for cases authorized under the OPA the 

































FIGURE 1: Settlements by Year, in Millions of Dollars. Source: NOAA, Damage Assessment and 
Restoration Program 
 
Figure 1 shows total “coastal” NRD claims, by year.113 The CERCLA claims roughly 
correspond to damages caused by non-oil hazardous substances. The remainder are 
predominately oil-related damages.  
In one sense NRD costs are a relatively small fraction of total oil spill liability. This is 
due to the fact that NRD claims are brought in only 10 percent of the coastal oil spills reported 
                                                 
112 As noted earlier, cases can also be brought under the CWA and the NMSA.  
113 See note 111. 
26 Resources for the Future  Boyd 
each year.114 NRD costs can be a large percentage of a particular case, however. A study of spills 
between 1984 and 1997 found that NRD damages—when they are claimed —account for 26% of 
the total damages, which include response costs, third-party claims, and government penalties.115 
The significance of NRD liabilities remains a subject of debate. In the eyes of NRD 
reform advocates (typically representing the regulated community), future NRD liabilities pose a 
huge potential cost.116 In the eyes of government trustees, NRD claims represent a small and 
manageable fraction of the environmental costs generated by polluting vessels and facilities.117  
  
5. Financial Assurance’s Role in Compensation and Deterrence 
In combination with liability law, financial responsibility rules foster the internalization 
of social costs by polluters by ensuring that firms possess the resources needed to compensate 
society for environmental costs. Insolvency can truncate the penalties borne by strictly liable tort 
                                                 
114 See Conner and Gouget, note 88.  This percentage is in part a reflection of the significant costs associated with 
damage assessment and the pursuit of NRD claims. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Outlook for and 
Experience with Natural Resource Damage Settlements, GAO/RCED-96-7l, April 1996, at 4. “Department of 
Justice officials state that the level of appropriations to fund federal natural resource damage programs is the single 
most important factor in determining how many sites can be assessed for damages.” 
115 Douglas Helton and Tony Penn, Putting Response and Natural Resource Damage Costs in Perspective, mimeo, 
paper ID #114 1999 International Oil Spill Conference, http://www.darp.noaa.gov/library/pdf/costsofs.pdf (accessed 
August 18, 2004). The study looked at 48 oil spill incidents occurring between 1984 and 1997. 
116 See statement of George Mannina, Director, Coalition for NRD Reform, Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, U.S. Senate, September 4, 1997. “When the NRD coalition formed two years ago, we were told NRD was a 
small problem involving only a few sites. A scant two years later, federal trustees state that they want to use their 
NRD authority at half the NPL sites and at 80,000 surface lagoons, 14% of all U.S. lake acreage and 4% of all U.S. 
river miles.” 
117 See testimony of Douglas Hall, NOAA, 1995 House Hearing, note 86 supra. “With regards to the claim that 
NRD is a sleeping giant that is going to bankrupt industry, this is simply not the case. It amounts to nothing more 
than speculation that is unsupported by the record. We have had less than 5% of the sites on the national priorities 
list that have required compensation for natural resource injuries in addition to remediation. The compensation for 
natural resource damage at all NPL remedial sites has been less than 1% of the cost of remediation.” 
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defendants and thereby reintroduce the possibility of externalized social costs.118 Any such 
externalization means that potential defendants will not be sufficiently motivated to take 
precautions against risk.119 Bankruptcy and corporate dissolution defeat the law’s ability to force 
polluter cost internalization by allowing many firms to abandon environmental responsibilities 
after reaping short-term financial gains. Nonrecoverable environmental obligations are more than 
a theoretical possibility. The U.S. landscape is littered with environmentally damaging 
operations that were either abandoned entirely or left unreclaimed due to bankruptcy.120 
Two financial assurance rules govern marine oil and hazardous waste operations. The 
first rule, authorized by both OPA and CERCLA, governs water-borne vessels that carry oil or 
hazardous substances.121 The second rule, authorized by OPA, governs offshore facilities used 
for oil exploration, drilling, production, or transport.122 The vessel and offshore facility financial 
responsibility rules describe, among other things, implementation schedules, types of facilities to 
which the rules apply, financial instruments with which compliance can be achieved, minimum 
coverage amounts, and enforcement procedures. Individual coastal states may also impose 
                                                 
118  Bankruptcy proceedings do not always limit the ability to recover costs, though they certainly do not foster cost 
recovery.  Generally speaking, debtors are protected from creditors (which can include tort victims) by the 
“automatic stay” provision of the U.S. bankruptcy code, 11 USC § 362(a).  There is, however, a “police and 
regulatory power exception” to the automatic stay.  The exception states that the automatic stay does not apply to the 
“commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental 
unit's police or regulatory power,” 11 USC § 362(b)(4).  Courts have generally held that a CERCLA action is an 
exercise of the government's police or regulatory power and is not subject to the automatic stay. See generally, 
Richard L. Epling, “Impact of Environmental Law on Bankruptcy Cases,” 26 Wake Forest Law Review, 69 (1991). 
119  For analyses that have explored or employ this reasoning, see motivation to take precaution against risk. For 
analyses that explore or employ this reasoning, see Alan Schwartz,  Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and 
Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote-Risk Relationship, 14 J.  Legal Stud. 689, 1985; Steven Shavell, The 
Judgment-Proof Problem, 6 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., 45, 1986; William  Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic 
Structure of Tort Law, 1987; Lewis Kornhauser and Richard Revesz,  Apportioning Damages Among Potentially 
Insolvent Actors, 19 J. Legal Stud. 617, 1990; and James Boyd and  Daniel Ingberman, Noncompensatory Damages 
and Potential Insolvency, 23 J. Legal Stud. 895, 1994.  
Note that the mere possibility of bankruptcy is sufficient to weaken liability’s ability to deter.  The corollary to 
this statement is that bankruptcy need not already be observed for it to have an effect on firm incentives.  From the 
standpoint of ex ante decision making, whenever bankruptcy occurs with a positive probability the incentive to make 
costly investments in risk reduction is reduced. 
120 See James Boyd, “Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding and Assurance Rules 
Fulfilling Their Promise?” 20 Research in Law and Economics (2002) (also available at 
http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-01-42.pdf). 
121 33 USC §2702; 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(1). The vessel financial responsibility rules are codified at 33 CFR part 138. 
122 OPA §1016. The offshore facility financial responsibility rules are codified at 30 CFR part 253.  
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financial responsibility requirements on vessels using their waters. For example, in 2004 
Massachusetts passed a law requiring up to $1 billion in coverage for certain vessel operators.123  
The vessel rule applies to tank vessels of any size, foreign-flag vessels of any size, and 
mobile offshore oil and gas drilling units.124 Some smaller commercial vessels, such as barges 
not carrying oil or hazardous substances, are excluded from the regulations. The offshore facility 
rule applies to facilities “in, on, or under” navigable waters. Covered facilities include platforms, 
terminals, refineries, and pipelines used for oil exploration, drilling, and production.125 
Vessel liability limits are a function of the vessel’s size and type of cargo (oil vs. 
hazardous substances).126 For large vessels, the limit (and coverage requirement) is $1,200 per 
gross ton for oil cargo and $600 per gross ton for hazardous substance cargo. Offshore facility 
liability limits are based on calculations of the volume of a “worst-case” oil spill discharge. 
There are four types of “allowable mechanism” that can be used by firms to demonstrate the 
existence of coverage: insurance, surety bond, self-insurance, and financial guaranty.127 All four 
mechanisms are designed to ensure that liabilities can be satisfied, up to the statutory coverage 
requirements. 
Insurance and surety bonds are financial commitments, purchased from third parties, 
guaranteeing payment of claims arising from liabilities of the purchaser. Generally speaking, 
insurance contracts “pay out” when a liability claim arises. Surety bonds are somewhat different 
in that the risk of loss remains with the principal (rather than being transferred to an insurer). The 
surety pays out only when the principal defaults.128 In most other respects, however, these two 
instruments are substantially similar. Not all insurers and sureties are acceptable coverage 
                                                 
123 State of Massachusetts, Chapter 251 of the Acts of 2004: An Act Relative to Oil Spill Prevention and Response 
in Buzzards Bay and Other Harbors and Bays of the Commonwealth. 
124 33 CFR 138.12. 
125 30 CFR 253.3. 
126 See 33 CFR §138.80(f)(3) 
127 The mechanisms are described at 33 CFR 138.80 (for vessels) and 30 CFR 253.28-31 (for offshore facilities).  
128 Schmitt v. Insurance Co. of North America (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 245, 257.  Typically, though, either the 
principal or surety may be sued on a bond, and the entire liability may be collected from either the principal or the 
surety.  This characteristic of surety bonds is also tempered by the FR rules’ “direct action” requirements, described 
below.  
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providers. In the case of surety companies, they must be one of those certified by the U.S. 
Treasury Department.129  
Self insurance allows relatively deep-pocketed companies to satisfy the coverage 
requirement by demonstrating sufficient financial strength. The vessel rule requires that two 
measures of financial strength, “working capital” and “net worth,” both be greater than the 
coverage requirement. The tests require not only financial strength, but also financial strength 
based on domestic assets, in order to foster cost recovery. When using the financial test, firms 
must make annual reports that are independently audited according to generally accepted 
accounting practices.  
A financial guaranty, or indemnity, agreement allows another firm, such as a parent 
corporation, to satisfy the coverage requirement. Financial guarantors must themselves pass the 
corporate financial test and agree to guarantee the liabilities of the potentially liable firm. The 
requirements are identical to those for self-insurers, including the domestic assets requirement.  
An important policy question is whether financial assurance for environmental liabilities 
should be made mandatory. An alternative, of course, is to rely on the voluntary provision of 
environmental coverages by private markets. Clearly, if left to themselves, private markets will 
demand and supply environmental insurance coverage. We know this, because we can observe 
such markets in active operation. The question, of course, is whether markets will voluntarily 
provide adequate insurance coverage from the standpoint of public policy. When purchased 
voluntarily, insurance benefits the purchaser by reducing risk, which is valuable in the presence 
of risk aversion. Note, however, that insurance is not voluntarily purchased as a means to 
internalize costs. In fact, cost internalization is directly at odds with the profit motive. When a 
firm expects to externalize some fraction of large liability claims against it (the judgment-proof 
problem), the desire for insurance in response to risk aversion will be countered by the desire to 
avoid internalizing otherwise externalized costs.  
Why does insurance imply greater cost-internalization by an insured? In the United States 
any insurer providing coverage to a potentially judgment-proof customer must build into the 
insurance cost its own exposure to the insured’s liabilities. Insurers have been exposed to such 
costs under U.S. law. Demand for environmental insurance thus usually involves this tradeoff: 
risk-spreading versus greater cost internalization. When a firm’s potential liabilities exceed its 
                                                 
129 30 CFR 253.31; 33 CFR 138.80(b)(2). 
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capital value, the disincentive to purchase insurance (greater cost internalization) is likely to 
outweigh the benefits of insurance (reduced uncertainty). 
Finally, political opposition to mandatory financial responsibility serves as a 
confirmation that insurance is unlikely to be provided voluntarily. While some opposition is due 
to complaints regarding arguable imperfections in the mandatory mechanisms themselves (e.g., 
the P&I Clubs’ opposition to the lack of policy defenses), many of the complaints are due simply 
to the obvious costs of compliance.130 These costs, of course, are exactly what will inhibit the 
spontaneous voluntary development of an adequate cost-internalizing environmental insurance 
market. However, private sector coverage mechanisms are available, and at rates that can be 
absorbed by most of the firms to which the requirements apply. Moreover, the trends in coverage 
availability and premium affordability are positive.131  
Even with OPA and CERCLA’s financial responsibility provisions a significant fraction 
of spill damages go uncollected due to bankruptcy or dissolution. One illustrative statistic is that 
between 1990 and 2002 more than 17% of payments from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund were 
unrecoverable due to bankruptcy or dissolution.132  
6. Conclusion 
Two distinctive features of the Oil Pollution Act and related aspects of CERCLA are 
worthy of international emulation. The first is the creation of liability for natural resource 
damages. For both economic and environmental reasons, NRD liability is an important 
                                                 
130 A focus of lobbying efforts in the United States is for the relaxation of the conditions under which firms can self-
insure (i.e., not have to purchase insurance from third parties).  It is clearly in a firm’s economic self-interest to 
qualify. According to one committee reviewing such proposals “additional mechanisms for qualifying as a self-
insurer are needed to ensure that the costs of demonstrating OSFR do not cause serious economic harm to 
responsible parties.”  Minerals Management Service, OCS Policy Committee Passes Recommendations on Oil 
Pollution Act Financial Responsibility Requirements (#50033), May 4, 1995 (viewed at 
http://www.mms.gov/ooc/press/1995/50035.txt).  The public policy implications of relaxed qualifying conditions are 
negative, since relaxed conditions thwart cost internalization.  The unsurpising message to be taken from such a 
statement, however, is that greater cost internalization is costly.  It is something firms wish to avoid, rather than 
something they will pursue voluntarily. 
131 See James Boyd, “Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding and Assurance Rules 
Fulfilling Their Promise?” 20 Research in Law and Economics (2002). 
132 The trust fund is a public revenue fund used to finance responses to spills.  The fund then seeks collection  
of response and other costs from the responsible party.  National Pollution Funds Center, Year in Review  
FY2001-02, p. 10. 
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component of statutes designed to deter environmentally damaging behavior and provide 
compensation necessary to restore injured resources. Society in the broadest sense derives 
significant benefits from ecological assets in their natural state. While difficult to estimate with 
precision, these social benefits should be included in a regulatory calculus that seeks to 
internalize costs and make the polluter pay. NRDs are the principal mechanism to foster 
internalization of costs imposed on collective, public environmental resources.  
The second distinctive feature of compensation law is the inclusion of mandatory asset 
and insurance requirements, or financial responsibility rules. These rules address a practical 
problem associated with the use of liability: the possibility that a defendant will dissolve or lack 
the wealth necessary to pay its liabilities after an accident. Financial responsibility rules are thus 
an important compliment to liability law. Particularly because marine accidents can create in an 
instant multi-million dollar liabilities, regulations should be in place to ensure that such liabilities 
will in fact be internalized by a polluter.  
While significant implementation issues must be confronted, particularly as regards the 
calculation of natural resource damages, NRD liability and financial responsibility rules foster an 
environmentally sound and economically efficient approach to the regulation of marine and 
coastal spills.  
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